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Abstract— Secure distributed data compression in the presence
of an eavesdropper is explored. Two correlated sources that need
to be reliably transmitted to a legitimate receiver are available
at separate encoders. Noise-free, limited rate links from the
encoders to the legitimate receiver, one of which can also be
perfectly observed by the eavesdropper, are considered. The
eavesdropper also has its own correlated observation. Inner
and outer bounds on the achievable compression-equivocation
rate region are given. Several different scenarios involving
the side information at the transmitters as well as multiple
receivers/eavesdroppers are also considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of wireless sensor networks and dis-
tributed video applications, distributed source compression
has become an important research area. A significant amount
of effort has been devoted to understanding the information
theoretic limits of distributed lossless and lossy compression
and developing codes to achieve these limits. However, in
many real-life applications involving distributed compression,
such as distributed video surveillance or monitoring of some
private information, secure compression and communication
while meeting the end-to-end quality of service requirements
becomes important. In this paper we consider the information
theoretic limits of secure lossless source compression in the
presence of an adversary who has access to some of the links
in the network as well as its own correlated observation of
the data to be compressed. We consider information theoretic
secrecy, that is, we want to limit the information leakage to
a computationally unbounded eavesdropper who has the full
knowledge of the compression algorithms used.
We first consider a simplified model of the general secure
distributed compression problem, composed of two transmit-
ters Alice and Charlie with correlated observations, a receiver
Bob, and an eavesdropper Eve who is interested in the data
of Alice. Eve eavesdrops Alice’s channel to Bob, i.e., it
knows Alice’s message to Bob exactly. Eve also has her own
correlated side information. We consider the scenario in which
both Alice’s and Charlie’s data need to be reconstructed at
Bob reliably while Eve is interested in only Alice’s infor-
mation source. Later, we consider various cases involving
the availability of the side information at different terminals.
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Fig. 1. Two terminal secure distributed compression. The eavesdropper (Eve)
can only access one of the links.
Finally, we analyze cases with multiple receivers or multiple
eavesdroppers.
In Wyner’s classical wiretap channel model [1], nonzero
secrecy rate can be achieved without using a secure key, if the
intended receiver has a better quality communication channel
than the eavesdropper. It was observed in [3] and [4] that,
secrecy can also be generated through correlated observations
at the legitimate users. In our model, since the channels
are not noisy, the techniques of [1] do not apply; however,
based on the ideas of [3], [4], it is still possible to achieve
secrecy by exploiting the correlated information transmitted
over secure links. Unlike [3], [4] which focus on generating
secret key using correlated information sources, we impose
the requirement of lossless decoding of the source sequence
at the legitimate receiver while keeping Alice’s information
secret from Eve.
In [8], Yamamoto considers lossy compression with security
constraints over a noisy broadcast channel, while the users
share a secure key as well. He showed that first applying
lossy source compression, then encrypting the compressed
bits using the secure key and finally transmitting over the
channel using a good wiretap channel code is optimal. In [5],
Merhav extends this result to the case in which the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper have correlated side information
under the assumption that both the channel output and the
side information at the eavesdropper are physically degraded.
He shows that replacing lossy compression with Wyner-Ziv
compression in the coding scheme of [8] is optimal. In [6],
the minimum leakage rate in secure lossless compression with
arbitrary side information is explored. It is shown in [6] that,
in the case of arbitrarily correlated receiver side information,
the usual Slepian-Wolf compression is not always sufficient.
Secure lossless compression of two correlated sources is
considered in [7], where the eavesdropper has access to only
one of the compressed bit streams and has no side information.
Slepian-Wolf compression suffices in this setup due to the lack
of side information at the eavesdropper.
We introduce the system model in Section II. In Sec-
tion III we give inner and outer bounds to the achievable
compression-equivocation rate region that generalize the well-
known Slepian-Wolf region to include secrecy constraints. In
Section IV we consider various different scenarios based on
the availability of the side information and also considering
multiple legitimate receivers or multiple eavesdroppers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
For the model in Fig. 1, we assume that Alice and Charlie
have access to length-N correlated source sequences AN and
CN , respectively. They want to transmit these sources to
Bob reliably over separate noise-free, finite capacity channels.
Alice’s transmission will also be perfectly received by an
eavesdropper called Eve who has her own correlated side
information EN . We model AN , CN , and EN as being gener-
ated independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according
to the joint probability distribution pACE(a, c, e) over the
finite alphabet A × C × E . While Alice and Charlie want
to transmit their sources reliably to Bob, they also want to
maximize the equivocation at Eve, which represents the un-
certainty of Eve about AN after receiving Alice’s transmission
and combining with her (Eve’s) own side information EN .
We will also consider scenarios involving multiple legitimate
receivers/eavesdroppers for which similar definitions apply.
Throughout the paper we assume that all the transmissions
are authenticated, i.e., the eavesdropper is passive.
An (MA,MC , N) code for secure source compression in
this setup is composed of an encoding function1 at Alice,
fA : A
N → IMA , an encoding function at Charlie, fC :
CN → IMC , and a decoding function at Bob, g : IMA ×
IMC → A
N × CN , where Ik denotes the set {1, . . . , k} for
k ∈ Z+. The equivocation rate of this code is defined as
1
N
H(AN |fA(A
N ), EN ), and the error probability as PNe =
Pr{g(fA(A
N ), fC(C
N )) 6= (AN , CN )}.
Definition 2.1: We say that (RA, RC ,∆) is achievable if,
for any ǫ > 0, there exist an (MA,MC , N) code such
that log(MA) ≤ N(RA + ǫ), log(MC) ≤ N(RC + ǫ),
H(AN |fA(A
N ), EN ) ≥ N(∆−ǫ) and PNe < ǫ. Let R denote
the set of all achievable (RA, RC ,∆) triplets.
III. SECURE DISTRIBUTED COMPRESSION
For the model in Section II, when we remove the secrecy
requirements, the problem reduces to the well-known Slepian-
Wolf coding of correlated sources. However, the solution in
the case of distributed compression with secrecy constraints is
not a direct extension of the Slepian-Wolf theorem.
1We assume deterministic coding in the analysis for simplicity, but the
proofs follow similarly for randomized coding which is modeled by assuming
independent random variables at the terminals and deterministic coding
functions that depend on these random variables.
Definition 3.1: Let U and V be two random variables
jointly distributed with A,C and E and taking values over the
finite alphabets U and V . We define Pin as the set of (U, V )
that satisfy H(C|A, V ) = 0 with a joint distribution of the
form pACEpU|ApV |C . We define Pout as the set of (U, V )
that satisfy H(C|A, V ) = 0 and the Markov chain conditions
U −A− (C,E) and V − C − (A,E).
Definition 3.2: We define Rin as the convex hull of the set
of all (RA, RC ,∆) for which there exists (U, V ) ∈ Pin such
that
RC ≥ I(C;V ), (1)
RA ≥ H(A|V ), (2)
∆ ≤
[
I(A;V |U)− I(A;E|U)
]+
, (3)
∆ ≤ min{RC −H(C|A), I(A;C)} and (4)
∆ ≥ [H(A|E) −RA]
+, (5)
where [x]+ = max{x, 0}, and Rout as the convex hull of the
set of all (RA, RC ,∆) for which there exists (U, V ) ∈ Pout
such that (1)-(5) hold.
Our main result is the following inner and outer bounds on
the set of all achievable triplets of Definition 2.1.
Theorem 3.1: Rin ⊆ R ⊆ Rout.
Proof: The sketch of the proof is given in Appendix I.
When the eavesdropper has no side information, i.e., E is
constant, then the inner and outer bounds become tight. The
following corollary can be obtained similar to Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 3.2: When there is no side information at the
eavesdropper, the compression-equivocation rate region is
characterized by
RC ≥ H(C|A),
RA ≥ H(A|C),
RA +RC ≥ H(A,C), and
[H(A)−RA]
+ ≤∆ ≤ min{I(A;C), RC −H(C|A)}.
We skip the proof, which can also be obtained as a special
case of the result in [7]. The achievability is simply from the
usual Slepian-Wolf compression, that is, we let U be constant.
IV. UNCODED SIDE INFORMATION AT BOB
A special case of Theorem 3.1 is obtained when we have
RC ≥ H(C), that is, CN can be recovered by Bob with
an arbitrarily small probability of error. Equivalently, we can
assume that the side information sequence BN = CN is
available directly to Bob. The compression-equivocation rate
region for this special case is given as below, which can be
obtained from Theorem 3.1.
Corollary 4.1: For uncoded side information BN at Bob,
(RA,∆) is an achievable compression-equivocation rate pair
if and only if,
RA ≥ H(A|B), (6)
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ [I(A;B|U)− I(A;E|U)]+, and (7)
RA +∆ ≥ H(A|E), (8)
for some U such that U −A− (B,E) form a Markov chain.
While Corollary 4.1 requires an auxiliary codebook gener-
ated by U in the general case to conceal the source from the
eavesdropper, in [9] we show that, when Bob’s side informa-
tion B is less noisy [2] than Eve’s side information E, Slepian-
Wolf binning achieves the highest possible equivocation rate,
i.e., (7) is maximized by a constant U . Furthermore, when
Bob’s side information is a stochastically degraded version
of Eve’s side information, no positive equivocation rate is
achievable, and ∆ = 0.
In [9], we also show that the availability of either Bob’s
or Eve’s side information at Alice potentially increases the
equivocation rate of the eavesdropper, while the compression
rate bound on RA remains intact. When Alice does not have
access to BN , ∆ = 0 if B is independent of A. However,
when BN is available to Alice, it is useful even if they are
independent. This scenario is equivalent to Shannon’s secret
key model, in which a secure key, independent of the message,
at rate H(B) is shared by Alice and Bob.
Lemma 4.2: If B is independent of (A,E) and available to
Alice as well, then (RA,∆) is achievable if and only if
RA ≥ H(A) and
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ min{H(B), H(A|E)}.
Proof: The achievability follows by first compressing
the source AN and then encrypting the compressed source
bits with the secure shared key BN , i.e., one time pad. The
converse can be obtained from Corollary 4.1.
Now we compare two scenarios of having Eve’s side
information at Alice or Bob. When EN is available to Bob, the
side information of Eve becomes physically degraded version
of Bob’s side information, and Slepian-Wolf compression
would suffice [9]. The compression-equivocation rate region
is characterized by
RA ≥ H(A|B,E)
0 ≤ ∆ ≤ I(A;B|E) and
RA +∆ ≥ H(A|E).
Note that, having EN at Bob helps decrease the compression
rate bound on RA as well. Furthermore, as shown in [9]
providing EN to Alice in addition to Bob would not help.
On the other hand, when EN is available to Alice, the
compression-equivocation rate region is given by [9] RA ≥
H(A|B), 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ I(A;B|E) and RA + ∆ ≥ H(A|E).
Comparing the two regions when EN is available to Alice or
to Bob, we see that the latter requires a smaller compression
rate due to a better side information at the receiver, while the
equivocation rates are equal.
V. MULTIPLE LEGITIMATE RECEIVERS/EAVESDROPPERS
Consider K legitimate receivers, each with its own corre-
lated side information Bk for k = 1, . . . ,K , that want to
receive Alice’s information reliably, while there is only one
eavesdropper Eve. In the absence of an eavesdropper, a rate
of maxkH(A|Bk) is necessary and sufficient for simultaneous
reliable transmission to all the receivers [11].
From Corollary 4.1, considering each receiver separately,
the equivocation rate is bounded as ∆ ≤ max{H(A|E,Uk)−
H(A|Bk, Uk)} where the maximization is over Uk satisfying
the Markov chain Uk − A − (Bk, E) for k = 1, . . . ,K .
The minimum of these individual equivocation rate bounds
serves as an upper bound; however, achievability of it together
with RA ≥ maxkH(A|Bk) does not follow directly. The
achievability proof outlined in Appendix I requires an auxiliary
codeword to be decoded by the receiver. However, for multiple
receivers, the auxiliary codebook Uk that maximizes the equiv-
ocation rate for one of the users, might not be decodable by an-
other user. Imposing such a decoding constraint requires a total
transmission rate of maxk I(A;Uk|Bk)+maxkH(A|Bk, Uk),
which might be greater than maxkH(A|Bk), the required rate
without the secrecy constraint.
Below, we give the compression-equivocation rate region in
case of multiple receivers for two special cases. Proofs are
omitted due to space limitation.
Corollary 5.1: If A−Bk −E form a Markov chain for all
k = 1, . . . ,K , then (RA,∆) is achievable if and only if,
RA ≥ max
k
H(A|Bk),
∆ ≤ min
k
{H(A|E)−H(A|Bk)}, and
RA +∆ ≥ H(A|E).
Corollary 5.2: If A−B1−· · ·−BK form a Markov chain,
then (RA,∆) is achievable if and only if,
RA ≥ H(A|BK),
∆ ≤ max{I(A,BK |U)− I(A;E|U)}, and
RA +∆ ≥ H(A|E),
where the maximization is over auxiliary random variables U
such that U −A− (B1, . . . , BK , E) form a Markov chain.
In Corollary 5.1, due to the degradedness of E with respect
to Bk’s, picking a constant U is optimal for all receivers. In
Corollary 5.2, we use the auxiliary codebook U that is chosen
with respect to the worst receiver side information BK .
Similarly, there may be multiple non-cooperating eavesdrop-
pers all of which have their own correlated side information.
Suppose there are K eavesdroppers, the k-th of which has side
information Ek. We have K equivocation rates defined as
∆k ,
H(AN |fA(A
N ), ENk )
N
for k = 1, . . . ,K.
This time, we pick the auxiliary codebook that simultaneously
achieves the corresponding equivocation rates ∆k.
Corollary 5.3: (R,∆) is achievable for the multiple eaves-
dropper scenario if and only if,
RA ≥ H(A|B),
∆k ≤ [H(A|Ek, U)−H(A|B,U)]
+, and
RA +∆k ≥ H(A|Ek),
for k = 1, . . . ,K for some auxiliary random variable satisfy-
ing the Markov chain condition U −A− (B,E1, . . . , EK).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered secure distributed com-
pression in the presence of an eavesdropper. We have studied
the case in which one of the transmitters is wire-tapped by an
eavesdropper and we have shown that secure communication
can be achieved with the help of the second transmitter who
has its own correlated side information and a secure link to
the legitimate receiver. We have provided inner and outer
bounds to the compression-equivocation rate region for the
model studied. We have also considered availability of side
information at the transmitters, multiple legitimate receivers
or multiple eavesdroppers. Future directions include extension
to the lossy compression scenario.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
Inner bound: We fix p(u|a) and p(v|c) satisfying the
conditions in the theorem. Then we generate 2N(I(A;U)+ǫ1)
independent codewords of length N , UN(w1), w1 ∈
{1, . . . , 2N(I(A;U)+ǫ1)}, with distribution
∏N
i=1 p(ui). We ran-
domly bin all UN(w1) sequences into 2N(I(A;U|V )+ǫ2) bins,
calling them the auxiliary bins. For each codeword UN (w1),
we denote the corresponding auxiliary bin index as a(w1).
On the other hand, we randomly bin all AN sequences into
2N(H(A|V,U)+ǫ3) bins, calling them the source bins, and denote
the corresponding bin index as s(AN ). We also generate
2N(I(C;V )+ǫ4) independent codewords V N (w2) of length N ,
w2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2
N(I(C;V )+ǫ4)}, with distribution
∏N
i=1 p(vi).
For each typical outcome of AN , Alice finds a jointly
typical UN (w1). Then she reveals a(w1), the auxiliary bin
index of UN (w1), and s(AN ), the source bin index of AN ,
to both Bob and Eve; that is, the encoding function fA of
Alice is composed of the pair (a(w1), s(AN )). Using standard
techniques, it is possible to show that we have such a unique
index pair with high probability. Charlie observes the outcome
of its source CN , finds a jointly typical V N (w2) with CN ,
and sends the index w2 of V N over the private channel to Bob.
With high probability there will be a unique w2 such that CN
and V N (w2) are jointly typical.
Bob, having access to w2 and the auxiliary bin index
a(w1), can find the jointly typical UN (w1) correctly with high
probability. Then using UN , the source bin index s(AN ) and
V N (w2), Bob can reliably decode AN . Since H(C|A, V ) = 0,
knowing AN and V N correctly, Bob can find the correct CN
with high probability as well. Letting ǫi → 0 for i = 1, 2, 3
and 4, we can make the total communication rate of Alice
arbitrarily close to I(A;U |V ) + H(A|U, V ) = H(A|V ) and
the rate of Charlie to I(C;V ). Since (1)-(2) hold, these rates
can be communicated to Bob while having arbitrarily small
error probability for sufficiently large N .
The equivocation rate can be lower bounded as follow:
H(AN |a(w1), s(A
N ), EN ) = H(AN )− I(AN ; a(w1), E
N )
− I(AN ; s(AN )|EN , a(w1))
≥ H(AN )− I(AN ;UN , EN )−H(s(AN )) (9)
≥ H(AN |UN , EN )−NH(A|V, U)−Nǫ3 (10)
= N [H(A|U,E)−H(A|V, U)− ǫ3]
= N [I(A;V |U)− I(A;E|U) − ǫ3],
where (9) follows from the data processing inequality; and
(10) follows from the fact that s(AN ) is a random variable
over a set of size 2N(H(A|V,U)+ǫ3).
For (U, V ) ∈ Pin, we can show that
I(A;V |U)− I(A;E|U) ≤ I(A;C) and
I(A;V |U)− I(A;E|U) ≤ RC −H(C|A)
Hence (4) is not active in the inner bound.
Finally, we also have
1
N
H(AN |a(w1), s(A
N ), EN )
=
1
N
[
H(AN |EN )− I(AN ; a(w1), s(A
N )|EN )
]
≥ H(A|E)−
1
N
H(a(w1), s(A
N ))
≥ H(A|E)−RA.
Outer bound: We define
J , fA(A
N ) and K , fC(CN ).
From Fano’s inequality, we have
H(AN , CN |J,K) ≤ Nδ(PNe ), (11)
where δ(·) is a non-negative function with limx→0 δ(x) = 0.
Define Ui , (J,Ai−1, Ei−1) and Vi , (K,Ci−1). Note
that both Ui−Ai−(Ci, Ei) and Vi−Ci−(Ai, Ei) form Markov
chains. Then, we have the following chain of inequalities:
NRC ≥H(K)
≥I(CN ;K)
=
N∑
i=1
I(Ci;K|C
i−1) (12)
=
N∑
i=1
I(Ci;K,C
i−1) =
N∑
i=1
I(Ci;Vi), (13)
where (12) follows from the chain rule. We also have
NRA ≥H(J) ≥ H(J |K)
=H(AN , J |K)−H(AN |J,K)
≥H(AN |K)−Nδ(PNe ) (14)
≥
N∑
i=1
H(Ai|K,A
i−1, Ci−1)−Nδ(PNe ) (15)
=
N∑
i=1
H(Ai|K,C
i−1)−Nǫ (16)
=
N∑
i=1
H(Ai|Vi)−Nδ(P
N
e ), (17)
where (14) follows from (11) and the nonnegativity of entropy;
(15) follows as Ai− (K,Ai−1)−Ci−1 form a Markov chain;
and (16) follows as Ai − (K,Ci−1) − Ai−1 form a Markov
chain.
Next, we have the following set of inequalities:
Nδ(PNe ) ≥H(C
N |J,K) (18)
≥H(CN |AN ,K) (19)
=
N∑
i=1
H(Ci|Ai,K,C
i−1) (20)
=
N∑
i=1
H(Ci|Ai, Vi), (21)
where (18) follows from (11); (19) follows since conditioning
reduces entropy and J is a function of AN ; and (21) follows
form the definition of Vi.
For the equivocation rate converse, we have
N∆ = H(AN |J,EN )
= H(AN |J)− I(AN ;EN |J)
= H(AN |J,K) + I(AN ;K|J)− I(AN ;EN |J)
≤ Nδ(PNe ) +
N∑
i=1
I(Ai;K|J,A
i−1)−
N∑
i=1
H(Ei|J,E
i−1)
+H(EN |AN , J) (22)
≤ Nδ(PNe ) +
N∑
i=1
I(Ai;K|J,A
i−1, Ei−1)
−
N∑
i=1
H(Ei|J,E
i−1, Ai−1) +H(EN |AN ) (23)
≤ Nδ(PNe ) +
N∑
i=1
[
I(Ai;K,C
i−1|J,Ai−1, Ei−1)
− H(Ei|J,E
i−1, Ai−1) +H(Ei|Ai)
] (24)
=
N∑
i=1
[I(Ai;Vi|Ui)−H(Ei|Ui) +H(Ei|Ai)] +Nδ(P
N
e )
(25)
=
N∑
i=1
[I(Ai;Vi|Ui)− I(Ai;Ei|Ui)] +Nδ(P
N
e ) (26)
where (22) follows from Fano’s inequality and the chain rule;
(23) follows from the memoryless property of the source and
the side information sequences, and the fact that conditioning
reduces entropy; (24) follows from the chain rule and the
non-negativity of the mutual information; (25) follows from
definitions of Vi and Ui; and finally (26) follows since Ui −
Ai − Ei form a Markov chain.
We also have
Nδ(PNe ) ≥ H(A
N , CN |J,K) (27)
= H(J,K|AN , CN ) +H(AN , CN )−H(J,K)
≥ H(AN ) +H(CN )− I(AN ;CN )−H(J)−H(K)
= H(AN |J)−H(J |AN ) +NH(C|A)−H(K)
≥ H(AN |J,EN ) +NH(C|A) −NRC
where (27) follows from (11). We get
δ(PNe ) ≥ ∆+H(C|A)−RC , (28)
and
Nδ(PNe ) ≥ H(A
N , CN |J,K)
= H(AN , CN )− I(AN , CN ; J,K)
= H(AN , CN )−H(AN ) +H(AN |J)−H(CN )
+H(CN |K) + I(K; J)
≥ H(AN |J,EN)− I(AN ;CN )
≥ N∆−NI(A;C).
And finally we have
H(A|E) ≤
1
N
H(AN , J |EN )
=
1
N
[
H(J |EN ) +H(AN |EN , J)
]
≤
H(J)
N
+∆
≤ RA +∆. (29)
Now, we define a new independent random variable Q
uniformly distributed over the set {1, 2, . . . , N}, and A , AQ,
E , EQ, V , (VQ, Q), and U , (UQ, Q). Letting N → ∞
and PNe → 0 we obtain the outer bound in the theorem.
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